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ABSTRACT
Cloud Computing is quickly becoming a mainstream commodity. Several industry players
are behind the push and hype of their cloud services. They provide the services to customers
for a cost. Most information about their infrastructure is proprietary and incompatible with
other provider’s solutions. This is a concern for open standards and system security. Virtual-
ization of operating systems is a component necessary to operate in the cloud. Live migration
is the capability to migrate an executing virtual operating system while incurring no notice-
able downtime in system operation and connectivity. Virtualization solutions have a capability
to live migrate virtual operating systems between different physical systems. The capabilities
of live migration will be of considerable importance to cloud operations in the future. Live
migration has the opportunity to be misused by cloud providers creating additional security
concerns for the customer. This research looks at the live migration process of the Xen hyper-
visor to determine system anomalies that occur during the transfer process. Anomalies with
the network and CPU were discovered that are detectable by the virtualized operating system.
Based on these findings, the anomalies are statistically measured to create a profile. Detection
functions are created and analyzed for effectiveness.
1CHAPTER 1. Introduction
Every decade, there is a paradigm shift in the computing industry. Starting with the use of
mainframes in the 1960’s, the cost of computing components drastically decreased in the 1980’s
giving rise to the personal computer. Networking, ARPANET, the Internet, and the World
Wide Web followed. Media became portable and allowed users to take it anywhere. Today,
people can connect and communicate to the Internet almost anywhere. Cloud computing
leverages this accessibility to give users access to unprecedented amounts of data storage and
execution of resources for their needs without requiring more than a terminal. Cloud Computing
is the future according to Amazon, Microsoft, and other cloud providers. In the wake of the
recession, organizations are looking to minimize their resource costs and cloud computing is
being touted as the solution to the problem.
Cloud computing is a collection of joined technologies, primarily achieved through virtu-
alization. Most large organizations have implemented virtualization technologies for years to
reduce physical resource costs. Cloud computing is seen as an extension to this cost reduc-
tion. As organizations weigh the risks of joining the cloud, they recognize that they limit their
control of any data put on the cloud while they remain fully responsible for its protection.
Organizations have a hard time discerning how a cloud provider’s underlying technologies are
constructed. Most often, cloud providers are so busy trying to accrue customers and evolve
their infrastructure that little thought is put into understanding the original assumptions of
the individual technologies, which are violated when combined with the other systems. These
violations increase the likelihood that threats will materialize [1].
Virtualization technologies have long offered solutions to migrate data between different
physical hosts and customers have taken advantage of this capability in their datacenters.
As cloud computing continues to evolve, eventually, customers will insist on having the live
2migration capability in the cloud, or providers will find the feature to useful to ignore. By
creating a profile of the live migration process from the view of a virtualized operating system,
ad hoc detection algorithms are derived to monitor system activity and determine when live
migration occurs.
3CHAPTER 2. Background and Related Work
In this chapter a formal definition of cloud computing is presented and the main technol-
ogy behind it, virtualization, is also addressed. Several cloud computing frameworks will be
investigated as well as the advantages and disadvantages of cloud computing.
2.1 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is the paradigm shift of the next decade. NIST’s definition is the most
prevailing and dominate.
“Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network ac-
cess to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers,
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released
with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model
promotes availability and is composed of five essential characteristics, three services
models, and four deployment models [2].”
The essential characteristics are: on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource
pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured service. The service models include: Software-as-a-
Service (SaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS). The de-
ployment models are: private cloud, community cloud, public cloud, and hybrid cloud.
2.1.1 Advantages
Most often, what makes organizations consider the cloud is the reduced cost. As customers
are charged per execution-hour or gigabyte of storage, they do not need to worry about hardware
maintenance and upgrade costs or the additional cost that comes with underutilized physical
4systems. The use of virtualization allows for easy scalability, whether by duplicating instances
or by changing the amount of CPU and memory available on a virtual machine. Mobility
has several advantages. The location and placement of resources in the cloud is not a factor
in accessing the information. A benefit is that the execution environment and data can be
placed closer to the location of highest demand. The cloud computing environment moves the
administration of the physical systems to the cloud provider, creating a central administration of
cloud services. This allows customer’s IT departments to focus on their organizations solutions.
Most cloud providers have several locations where they host customer data. This distributed
approach to resources creates system redundancy. If portions of the resources go down, it will
have minimal affect on the other resources.
2.1.2 Disadvantages
The biggest operational disadvantage is the lack of interoperability between providers. This
has occurred mainly as organizations have built their cloud and are keeping the structure,
architecture, and framework private. Even though many cloud providers’ market 99% or more
service availability, many applications are not well suited for use in the cloud. Two application
types include those of high-availability and real-time environments. When data is stored on
the cloud, there is an expectation that it is frequently backed up to alternate locations. This
is not always the case. Organizations that do not have separate and distinct data back-up
locations from the cloud provider alternate locations for back-up data are at risk of losing their
business data and potentially customers if things go wrong. Many Service Level Agreements
(SLAs) protect the cloud provider from fault, lost revenue and business, and legal action [3].
The biggest concerns with the cloud are security and privacy.
Cloud providers advertise a high level of security within their environments. There is not
much a customer can do except have a contract dictating actions of the provider. Another
aspect of security is customers’ data is only as secure as the weakest cloud customer [4]. The
provider can manage the minimum security level of the environment, but system security is
also dependent on how secure the other customers are with their virtualized environments.
When one of those environments is compromised or malicious, it is easier for intruders to get
5access to other customers’ environments. There are several reasons why privacy is at risk.
First, the provider or provider’s employees have the opportunity to view customer’s stored
data. Secondly, the cloud provider has their own interests and is more likely to give data to
authorities. This was the case when the FBI seized servers from a data center affecting 50
organizations [5]. Finally, a cloud provider could potentially disappear or be sold, leaving the
customer in a situation where they may not be able retrieve or recover their data.
2.1.3 Cloud Computing Incidents
Two major issues illustrate the risk of moving data to the cloud, affecting the cloud’s public
appearance: hacking and data loss. Recently, Google’s web-based email service, Gmail, had a
glitch [6] that treated a small portion of existing users as new users, removing all their mail,
and showing them the interface seen by new users. In this case, Google was able to restore the
data to the accounts. Similarly, a Flickr user’s account, which was wrongfully deleted by an
employee, was not as lucky. Flickr does not have the tools to restore deleted data or accounts
[7]. A hacker was able to access Twitter’s confidential information, stored on Google’s cloud
with Google Apps, when a Twitter employee’s email password was obtained [8]. These incidents
show the fragility of the cloud and what happens when things go wrong.
2.1.4 Amazon EC2
The Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) is one of eight services of the Amazon Web
Services (AWS) infrastructure, their cloud computing platform [9]. EC2 provides a virtual
computing environment using the Xen hypervisor. Amazon charges customers on a pay-per-
use pricing model. Amazon allows customers to scale the number of running instances to meet
their needs in a timely manner. With the capability to bridge with existing IT infrastructures,
it is proving to be effective for many businesses with its guarantee of 99.95% uptime [10].
Currently, live migration is not possible on Amazon’s platform [4]. Amazon allows monitoring
of services through its Service Health Dashboard [11], see Figure 2.1.
Netflix is one of the larger consumers of Amazon’s cloud platform. Amazon is a public cloud
and there may be multiple tenants on the servers being utilized by Netflix. Netflix does not
6Figure 2.1 Amazon Web Services: Service Health Dashboard
know what tasks the other tenants are performing, but has been able to determine that certain
workloads of other tenants cause Netflix to be penalized, leading to a loss in performance.
Their methods of measuring performance are not public but could include characteristics such
as response time, throughput, or resource utilization. When performance reduction has reached
a certain threshold, Netflix is no longer willing to remain on those servers. However, in order
to get on a new server, it is necessary to destroy the current virtual machine and start a new
instance, which will most often result in placement on a different physical server [12]. This is
one instance where live migration would be extremely effective and useful.
72.1.5 Open Source Cloud Projects
Several open source projects have been created in an effort to expand the use of the cloud.
The EUCALYPTUS Cloud Computing Platform was created by researchers at the University
of California Santa Barbara to bring cloud computing to research and academia. Built to be
similar to Amazon’s infrastructure, it is capable of interacting with it. EUCALYPTUS has
since been turned into a corporation and is no longer entirely open source [13]. OpenStack is
another cloud computing project [14]. Many large industry players support the project. A big
contributor to open source cloud products is NASA with their NEBULA Cloud Computing
Platform [15].
2.1.6 Gartner Hype Cycle
The research firm Gartner has placed cloud computing on its Hyper Cycle list of emerg-
ing technologies for three years, since 2008. Figures 2.2 [16], 2.3 [17], and 2.4 [18] show the
placement of different emerging technologies. Based on the tends shown, cloud computing will
enter the “Trough of Disillusionment” in the next two years. In this phase, publicity will be
less effective and the uptake by consumers will be less. Several cloud providers may fail, but
it is unlikely for few of the major providers who are capable of meeting the needs of the early
adopter customers.
8Figure 2.2 Gartner Hype Report 2008
Figure 2.3 Gartner Hype Report 2009
9Figure 2.4 Gartner Hype Report 2010
2.2 Virtualization
Since the introduction of commercial virtualization products, virtualization has moved be-
yond its humble mainframe origins [19]. Virtualization is playing an increasingly dominate role
in enterprise and personal computing. It provides several benefits including increased efficiency
and a reduction in physical resources. This thesis uses the virtualization definition of [20]:
“Virtualization is a framework or methodology of dividing the resources of a
computer into multiple execution environments, by applying one or more concepts
or technologies such as hardware and software partitioning, time-sharing, partial or
complete machine simulation, emulation, quality of service, and many others.”
This emulation of physical computer attributes creates an abstraction, hiding the underlying
physical implementation and functionality from the virtual environment. One advantage of this
emulation is the ability to easily migrate between different physical hosts. Microsoft Virtual PC,
VMware, and Xen are the dominate commercial virtualization products capable of emulating
x86-based computers. VirtualBox and KVM are other available solutions most commonly
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associated with linux environments. Virtualization products differentiate themselves by how
they virtualize the environment. VMware and Xen provide the capability to live migrate virtual
operating systems through the tools VMotion and XenMotion respectively. There are several
different ways environments can be virtualized. These virtualized environments are being
monitored and executed by a software component that manages all virtual machine executions
known as the virtual machine monitor or hypervisor. The hypervisor is also commonly referred
to as a host (or dom0 of Xen nomenclature). The virtual machines are referred to as guests (or
domU’s for Xen, where U is an integer larger than 0, each referring to a different virtualized
guest). Xen and VMware have integrated into their hypervisors the capability to monitor and
manage the migrations for the cloud provider. The technology was never intended to inform
the guest due to the virtualization abstraction.
2.2.1 Full Virtualization
Full virtualization is the ability to run unmodified operating systems in a virtual machine
[21][22]. Another type of virtualization is hardware-assisted virtualization. This uses a CPU
execution mode feature added in recent hardware technology to simplify the work of the virtual
machine manager. Although this is a distinct virtualization technique, nearly all virtualization
solutions require these hardware modes to be active to make full virtualization possible. AMD
and Intel provide hardware-assisted solutions through their AMD-V [23] and VT series [24]
products respectively.
2.2.2 Paravirtualization
Paravirtualization provides greater performance over full virtualization [22]. Better perfor-
mance can be characterized short response time, high throughput, or low resource utilization.
Environments that run in this configuration require modification to kernel calls. This type of
operating system is aware it is being virtualized. Typical modifications include device drivers,
memory management and non-virtualizable instructions. These instructions are replaced with
calls to the hypervisor, which will take care of the requests.
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2.2.3 Migration Techniques
A virtual machine and its state are stored as a file and can be manipulated as such by being
created, duplicated, shared, and copied [25]. When a virtual machine is being copied between
different physical hosts, it is said to be migrating. The migration techniques can be classified as
either static or dynamic. There are two methods for static migration and several for dynamic
migration. Static and dynamic techniques differ in their process of migrating data. A virtual
machine is completely inoperable while being migrated using static techniques while dynamic
techniques attempt to minimize the total downtime by allowing execution to continue while
the migration is occurring. The static techniques include static migration and cold migration.
In static migration, the virtual machine is completely shutdown through the operating system.
In cold migration the virtual machine is paused, suspended, or frozen in its current execution
state. Dynamic migration, also known as live migration, transmits memory pages between the
source and target hosts as the virtual machine continues executing. Live migration can benefit
both the cloud provider and cloud customer. If cloud providers’ have live migration enabled for
them but not cloud customers, transparency of the provider may become a customer concern.
The essential characteristic of on-demand self-service also comes into question, as technology
already exists to perform the migration and why not let the customer have some control. A
customer has a better understanding of how it will be useful for their systems. In the right
environment, it would allow a customer to live migrate a machine from their data center to the
cloud, something that at this point is only a dream. This does not mean that cloud providers
and cloud customers have to have the same live migration rights or capabilities. It does however
give customers more choices and allows for ease of transfer of the execution environment. The
two dynamic migration techniques are pre- and post-copy. The difference in these techniques
comes from which system (the source or target) is the primary unit of execution.
The source machine is the physical host containing the execution state of a virtual machine
prior to the migration process starting. The target machine is a different physical host where
the execution state of a virtual machine is being migrated too. The target machine will contain
the entire execution state after migration is completed. The data accessed by a virtual machine
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does not have to be on the same host of the execution state. Both VMotion and XenMotion
use the live migration pre-copy approach. See Figure 2.5 or Figure 2.6 to see how pre-copy and
post-copy live migration work respectively. The live migration process is composed of three
phases: setup, halt, and recover phase [26].
Live Migration Phases
Setup Phase: During this period, a target node and resources necessary for the virtual
machine on the target node are reserved.
Pre-Copy Method: Transfer rounds of dirtied memory pages
Post-Copy Method: No Addition actions
Halt Phase: At this time, the source node is halted and any required components to have the
target node become the primary node are transferred at this time.
Pre-Copy Method: Enters this phase when iterative transfer round limit is reached or reduced
it the paged set to the writable working set.
Post-Copy Method: Transfer of minimum execution state and target host become primary
machine.
Recover Phase: At this point, remaining components are migrated to the target node. The
target node is started and the source node is destroyed.
Pre-Copy Method: All components now exist on the target node.
Post-Copy Method: The target node begins the execution as pages are transferred from the
source.
13
Figure 2.5 Pre-copy Live Migration Approach
14
Figure 2.6 Post-copy Live Migration Approach
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2.3 Related Work
This section discusses several different applications of the related technologies. These
projects had significant influence in the cause and direction of this research.
2.3.1 Xen worlds: leveraging virtualization in distance education
The Xen Worlds project at Iowa State University uses Xen virtualization to create a virtual
lab environment for computer security courses [27]. The use of virtualized environments allows
students to practice security concepts on isolated systems. Previous research with this project
has created several security assignments and their associated environments. Due to a shift in
virtualization technology, research is expected to change from Xen to KVM.
2.3.2 PHANTOM
PHANTOM is a research initiative from IBM to assist organizations in managing their risk
by enhancing the security of virtualized systems [28]. The technology coverage is over five
domains:
• Information Security
• Threat and Vulnerability
• Application Security
• Identity and Access Management
• Physical Security
IBM’s technology integrates with the hypervisor to support compliance initiatives. Integration
at this level allows for comprehensive security monitoring below the virtual machines to ensure
they remain secure, in addition to increasing the security of the hypervisor.
2.3.3 Trusted Virtual Environment Module (TVEM)
Much of the trust in the cloud is in the cloud provider and their software. The TVEM
research project extends the trust model to allow the client to verify the trustworthiness of
16
the host platform and virtual environment [29]. The trustworthiness is determined by inferred
trust (the trust of other associates) and inherited trust (technical trust based on services and
configurations). Based on the calculated trustworthiness result, a client can determine whether
or not to use a service.
2.3.4 Security-as-a-Service
The cloud has created many “as-a-service” technologies, including Security-as-a-Service.
Security-as-a-service is defined as an “outsourcing model for security management [that] typi-
cally. . . involves applications such as anti-virus software delivered over the Internet [30].” AEP
Networks, Isheriff, McAfee, Panda, Symantec, Trend Micro, and Zscaler are several organiza-
tions offering Security-as-a-Service capabilities.
2.3.5 Empirical Exploitation of Live Virtual Machine Migration
Researchers at the University of Michigan have worked on taking advantage of weaknesses in
virtualization technologies to enable virtual systems to be migrated to a malicious host. They
define three different threat classes capable of exploiting the migration process; control plane,
data plane, and the migration module [31]. The control plane concerns the communication
mechanism that enables migration to occur. The data plane refers to the virtual machine state
as it is transferred across the wire. The migration module is the component that performs
the migration between the different physical hosts. This research was put to the test when
it was demonstrated at the 2009 Black Hat conference by security researchers Jon Oberheide
and Johanna Rutkowska. They discussed how attackers could use live migration to intercept
the virtualized environment during the transfer stages [32]. Although, they do not believe
the technique has been used by cyber-criminals, their demonstration showed that systems are
capable of being exploited.
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CHAPTER 3. Research Environment
This section will discuss the computing components involved in cloud architectures, the
chosen architecture, and applicable threat models are presented. This architecture is used for
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
3.1 Cloud Architectures
There are two main configurations for a cloud architecture, as seen in Figure 3.1 and Fig-
ure 3.2. Several distinctions can be made between the industry cloud model and the research
model. The industry cloud model is much larger in scale. For each service provided there
are potentially a large number of dedicated machines dispersed wherever the cloud provider
desires. These services and the data the use are connected by either Fibre channel or iSCSI
communication channels to Network Attached Storage or Storage Area Networks. The cloud
provider has several front end applications that allow customers the ability to manage compo-
nents of their virtual machines including starting, stopping, amount of memory and CPU’s per
instance, number of instances, and payment options for their usage of the services. Behind this
front end service is automated services that allocate, deallocate, and reserve system resource,
and monitor and charge for for system usage. Currently the research model is less scalable
with a focus on virtual machine execution services. The research test bed demonstrates the
capabilities of the cloud using two systems sharing data via a Network File System share and
communicating over Ethernet.
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3.2 Test Environment Architecture
In order to have the most visibility and control of the the environment, the NFS cloud
method was used (see Figure 3.2). Red Hat Enterprise Linux has good documentation on how
to set up this environment [33]. There are two systems, host1 and host2. Host1 is the host
containing the NFS share. The systems have the following configuration:
• Red Hat Enterprise Server release 5.6
• 2.6.18-238.5.1.el5xen kernel
• Two dual-core Intel Xeon processors at 1.6GHz
• 15 GB Memory
• 1 TB Hard Drive
• Libvirt Version: 0.8.2
• Xen hypervisor: 3.1.0
• Intel CPU virtualization extension (vmx) enabled
The migrated guest used to gather data had the following configuration:
• Red Hat Enterprise Server release 5.5
• 2.6.18-194.el5 kernel
• 1 virtual CPU
• 512 MB Memory
• 10 GB Hard Drive
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Figure 3.1 Industry Cloud Setup
Figure 3.2 Cloud Research Setup
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3.3 Threat Models
Cloud providers have control over their infrastructure and customers data. They own and
administer the infrastructure, how it evolves, and specifics of where a customer’s data resides
(they may be given a general area or region). It is necessary to watch the watchers. This
research assumes the cloud provider is a threat. From this perspective, there are two applicable
threat models:
Threat Model 1: The cloud provider is live migrating a customer’s virtual ma-
chine between two physical machines. The cloud provider is not trying to hide the
action besides not informing the user.
Threat Model 2: The cloud provider is live migrating a customer’s virtual ma-
chine between two physical machines and is deliberately trying to hide the migration
process from the customer.
This research refrains from addressing cloud provider motives for the live migration and
focuses instead on the act of live migration and whether or not the customer is informed as
the matters of importance. The first threat model can then be described as an uninformed live
migration, while the second model is a deceitful live migration. Both threat models can use
the same technique to detect live migration.
3.4 Repercussions
Whether or not live migration is occurring can reveal if the virtual machine is being intro-
duced to additional vectors of attack by other methods external of the cloud provider’s action.
These external threats can be classified into control plane, data plane, or the migration module.
Refer to Section 2.3.5 for more information on these threats. Live migration may also indicate
execution resources are being separated from data resources. This added separation can de-
crease the response time and throughput. Data or system accessibility may also be reduced or
fail. These performance reductions increase the cost of utilizing the service while reducing the
benefits.
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CHAPTER 4. Investigation
This section investigates the different properties of a virtual operating system and how
migrations or the cloud provider’s influence of the system may change the properties in a
noticeable way. These properties are investigated to determine reliable trust anchors. A trust
anchor is a reliable characteristic within a system that maintains its characteristics unless
disturbed by external influences causing a deviation from standard behavior. The trust anchors
will be based on the inherited trust of technology, inferred trust will not be applied. Differences
in full and paravirtualization occur mainly in the execution methods. The data received via
these methods are the same. There is no indication of one virtualization method providing a
better platform for detection.
4.1 Host Properties
The virtualization abstraction creates difficultly in gathering specific information regarding
the different hosts where a guest may reside. However, there are events within the virtual
environment that may indicate a change in system capabilities. When looking at host properties
there are several data properties of interest found in various files throughout the system.
4.1.1 CPU Information Profiling
File ‘/proc/cpuinfo’ contains CPU related information including number of processors, ven-
dor, clock speed, and CPU flags taken from kernel data structures. A change in the kernel would
be reflected in this file. It would be practical to give the guest capabilities of the current exe-
cution platform.
Signature: The migrations caused no change to this file. The properties were maintained
throughout the current execution lifecycle. In order to change the properties a system has to
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be rebooted. In order for a guest to execute on a system, it has to have system properties that
do not exceed those of the host. By giving the guest the properties of the least capable system,
it is capable of migrating to a larger set of hosts. This property is unreliable as a trust anchor.
Cloud Provider Action: The characteristics maintained in this file are important and ac-
tive changes seen throughout an execution lifecycle indicate worse problems. As many utilities
depend on the state of the data during system boot, a change during execution would not prop-
erly be resolved throughout the system leading to new vulnerabilities and potential program
failure.
Cloud Customer Resolution: Encrypting the virtual operating system and kernel is the
best precaution. This would make it difficult for the provider to determine if the customer is
accessing the file. It also reduces the attack vectors of the provider, requiring them to do an
action at the hypervisor level instead of on the guest.
4.1.2 Memory Information Profiling
Another component of interest is file ‘/proc/meminfo’ containing system memory utiliza-
tion. The total amount of memory available is not as important a factor as the amount used.
A technique called ballooning simplifies the transfer of unused memory. Considering memory is
the driving factor in the migration process, it would make sense that there would be a distinct
change.
Signature: The data in this file is constantly varying. No correlation was found between
the migrations and the consumption of memory. The dynamic nature of this file made it an
unreliable source to consider for detecting migration. This property is unreliable as a trust
anchor.
Cloud Provider Action: The cloud provider can increase the amount of memory on the
physical systems without the guest being aware. If the cloud provider were to reduce the
amount below that which the guest expects, it would not be able to migrate to that system.
If memory was removed from the machine it was operating on, which is unlikely as damage to
the physical system could result, the guest would see a portion of memory fail.
Cloud Customer Resolution: There is not much that the customer can do. Encrypting the
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virtual operating system and kernel is a start, as no other solutions are available at this time.
4.1.3 System Clock
The phrase “time is relative” is especially true in virtual environments. However, accurate
time is an important factor in applications and protocols, even those operating on the cloud.
On physical systems, the system clock depends on the environment where the machine is op-
erating; including temperature, altitude, pulse rate, and quality of material used in the device.
Where accurate time is important, Network Time Protocol or similar protocol is typically used.
Since system time is measured with the system clock, between periods of updating, there is a
possibility to shift the guests view of time. This view may affect other system operations in
unforeseen ways.
Signature: Clock Speed was maintained throughout experiments. Because cloud environ-
ments require the use of similar technologies for proper operation, a change that falls outside
of false-positive categories would indicate a move of long distances. This property is unreliable
as a trust anchor.
Cloud Provider Action: Although there is likelihood to change the clock rate in minute
intervals, doing so could affect multiple customers depending on their interactions.
Cloud Customer Resolution: It is essential that provider’s provide quality service for con-
tinued use of the services by a customer. Several legal factors (even with an SLA) may affect
the provider if this sort of action is taken.
4.2 Network Properties
As discovered in the previous section, guest configurations were unchanged throughout the
migration experiments. In order to keep the guests operating after migration, other character-
istics must have changed. Unlike the guests characteristics, the guest has limited control over
what is happening in the network. There is opportunity for diverse interaction with devices,
which reveal much about the entities location, either through characteristics maintained by the
guest or retrieved network data. The network must remain stable and operational or cloud
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applications begin to fail. This presents a challenge to providers desiring to hide their network
configuration while maintaining connectivity.
4.2.1 IP and MAC Address
Both the IP and MAC address are important to remain connected to all necessary systems.
Even when the guest is being virtualized, it makes sense for the MAC address to remain the
same. It uniquely identifies that specific device. This is not necessarily true for IP addresses.
Consider for example a wireless campus (such as a university, business, or community) inter-
connected with multiple access points. It is possible to “migrate” or move, between the access
points without changing the IP address. However, occasionally an access point may require the
device to release the IP address and reassociate to the new access point. A similar situation is
likely to happen in the cloud.
Signature: The properties obtained during start-up were maintained throughout the current
execution lifecycle. If one were to correlate a change in IP address to a migration, false positive
results would occur. Limitations of the test environment may have led to these results. If
more machines and additional subnetworks were in place, the added complexity may cause the
hypervisors to react differently. This is not a reliable trust anchor.
Cloud Provider Action: A provider is likely to use Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
(DHCP) for IP address distribution considering the variability of machines in the cloud at any
instant. A lease time of a specific duration could be set that hides the migration. The use of
a NAT and private IP addresses within the cloud infrastructure would lead to the customer
always seeing the public IP while the private IP is also hidden from the guest by the host. The
use of a VLAN would add to the difficultly of the customer’s detection.
Cloud Customer Resolution: A curious cloud customer could attempt a series of DHCP
release commands to determine if the guest receives a new IP address. This could help in iden-
tifying a host change as that host may be configured to a different server or subnet by revealing
different network configuration information. If a NAT is used, the guest could communicate
the private IP through a secure channel to an external source. This source would track public
and private IP addresses over time and signal when there is a concern.
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4.2.2 ARP Table Profiling
The ARP table reveals a lot about the local network configuration. Specifically, what other
machines are talking on the local area network. ARP works by sending a protocol packet on
the wire to let other systems know a devices IP to MAC address mapping. This information is
accessible via the ARP program or stored in the file “/proc/net/arp” (on RHEL 5).
Signature: In the default Xen network setup, the guest only sees one entry, that of the host
it resides on. For both machines a private IP address network is used. The host acts a router
for the guest through use of a virtual bridge. Even with multiple guests on a host, there was
difficulty communicating between them. During a migration, the MAC address of the host
would change. Migration revealed that the MAC address was random and multiple guests
could have a different MAC while residing on the same host. The environment setup limited
the the number of hosts and guests on the network, so full discovery of the extent usefulness
has not been studied. However, given the setup of the cloud and other network systems (a user
would expect these to be static), the characteristics found were unusual enough to be used to
detect the migration. This is a reliable trust anchor.
Cloud Provider Action: A possible action to defeat the effectiveness of this approach is to
create false positives, changing the MAC address as viewed by the guest. This adds complexity
as a gratuitous ARP is required potentially affecting other systems.
Cloud Customer Resolution: It is in the best interest of the provider to keep network
connections alive, the customer is at an advantage as a provider’s actions could affect commu-
nication between guest and host if done excessively.
4.2.3 Network Activity
The tcpdump program was used to gather data about the surrounding environment. On
several occasions, the tcpdump failed during live migration giving as an error the network was
down. This anomaly became of particular interest, however, it was hard to reproduce and it
did not happen during all migrations (it did not occur at other times) and the cause of the
issue is still unknown.
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Signature: When the tool detected that the network went down, the guest appears to be
being prepared for the halt phase. Although there is a high probability of false negatives, for
purposes of detecting migration, this technique is considered a reliable trust anchor.
Cloud Provider Action: Use of a migration method that does not cause a system to detect
a fake network outage is required. The use of the pre-copy migration method is a possible
candidate for revealing halt phase. The provider benefits because the technique is not 100%
effective.
Cloud Customer Resolution: This technique has false negatives, however when it does
happen its cause is either migration or network failure. A cloud provider would not want to
cause undue network failure, so migration is most likely what is happening when it is detected.
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CHAPTER 5. Implementation
This research is a side project of the Iowa State University (ISU) Xen Worlds project.
Recent technological advancements are causing the ISU Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering to play catch up in teaching virtualization and cloud computing. The Xen Worlds
project is a perfect platform to build these solutions. This chapter builds on the previous
chapter by experimenting with one host property and one network property. The host property
looks that the CPU throughput while the network property characterizes the network based
on packet response delay. Their statistical properties are measured to create ad hoc detection
algorithms. These algorithms are then scrutinized to determine their effectiveness.
5.1 Migration Monitoring
The Xen dom0 stores its log information in ‘/var/log/xen/xend.log,’ containing migration
as one of many characteristics. Both source and target machines log distinct messages contain-
ing start and ending times. This information was collected to determine the true migrations in
addition to their durations. Other notable information recorded include the number of itera-
tions of transferred memory and when a guest is suspended and restarted during the transfer
phase. Baseline measurements were taken of the migration process to determine duration and
transfer characteristics. The measurements were performed when the dom0 and domU were idle
and there was no unnecessary network activity. Table 5.1 shows data collected over a period
of 20 migrations. The results show a consistent migration period where the time recorded by
the source machine (migration average of 48.15 seconds) was greater than the target machine
(migration average of 47.36 seconds). The overall migration average was 47.75 seconds. This
discrepancy comes from the migration process, where it starts sooner on the source and only
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ends on the source machine once the migration is a success and it is notified by the target
machine. Note: All systems used NTP to ensure time accuracy.
Migration Source Target Source Target
Number Machine Machine Duration (seconds) Duration (seconds)
1 host1 host2 48.38 47.47
2 host2 host1 48.46 47.58
3 host1 host2 48.10 47.26
4 host2 host1 48.01 47.23
5 host1 host2 47.84 47.25
6 host2 host1 48.43 47.56
7 host1 host2 47.96 47.09
8 host2 host1 48.13 47.37
9 host1 host2 47.98 47.16
10 host2 host1 47.90 47.14
11 host1 host2 48.12 47.69
12 host2 host1 48.31 47.45
13 host1 host2 48.04 47.22
14 host2 host1 47.99 47.17
15 host1 host2 47.97 47.12
16 host2 host1 47.95 47.16
17 host1 host2 49.07 48.43
18 host2 host1 48.11 47.26
19 host1 host2 48.26 47.43
20 host2 host1 47.98 47.18
Table 5.1 Base Migration Measurements
5.2 CPU Throughput Profiling
An application type that exists in the cloud focuses on data computation where throughput
(number of instructions executed in a time interval such as a million instructions per second
[MIPS]) of the CPU is important. Memory is affected during the transfer process but no
research has been done to determine how the CPU is affected. Memory and disk may be
comprised of many hierarchies of different size and speed. They are built to support cache
misses (where it takes additional time to retrieve data from a different hierarchy layer). The
CPU is affected by the response times of memory and disk accesses. It is unknown how it
behaves during the live migration process. In the simplest data computation case, memory and
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disk access are minimized. This research looks at this simple case.
5.2.1 Data Collection
The method to collect data from this experiment was to record the duration it took to
perform a series of simple CPU events. The execution of these events is meant to be predictable
and reliably complete in the same time duration. For example, consider the MIPS ISA addi
instruction (syntax is “add $d, $s, $t”). The instruction is capable of being executed repeatedly
and consistently complete in the same duration. The guest used a C program compiled in GCC.
The program contained an infinite busy-loop and counter, capturing and printing the change
in system time required to execute 4x108 instructions. Use of memory is minimized to remove
any influence it may have on CPU execution.
5.2.2 Baseline Characteristics
The baseline data was collected from the guest for a period of 15 minutes. The results
can be seen in Table 5.2. The normalized baseline data reflects a normal distribution. There
are several measured data points above the execution duration of 1.64 seconds. These times
reflect independent execution cycles affected by external influences that are still undetermined.
However, this may include context switching for the execution of higher priority processes. In
an effort to simulate a user level process, no attempt was made to alter the programs default
priority.
Measure Baseline Non-migration Migration
(seconds) Interval (seconds) Interval (seconds)
Minimum 1.48 1.42 1.45
Maximum 1.74 2.13 5.23
Mean 1.55 1.55 1.63
Median 1.55 1.55 1.58
Mode 1.48 1.55 1.58
Standard Deviation 0.04 0.03 0.27
Table 5.2 Throughput Characteristics
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5.2.3 Migration Characteristics
Information regarding the migration characteristics is seen in Table 5.2 or Figure 5.1 (out-
liers removed). Figure 5.1 shows the relationship between the non-migration and migration
phases. The migration and non-migration intervals best approximate a normal distribution.
There were several outliers such as a maximum of 5.23 seconds to complete execution. Ignoring
those, there is considerable amount of overlap between the two distributions. Performing a
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reveals that the null hypothesis (both samples are drawn
from the same distribution) cannot be rejected. The asymptotic p-value for the data set was
0.3874.
Figure 5.1 Normalized Throughput Response Times
5.2.4 Detection Algorithm
This algorithm will keep a history of 3 minutes of collected CPU through data. The history
will contain the duration it took to execute the known set of instructions. This length is needed
to get a the most accurate measure of mean and standard deviation. It also reduces the chance
that migration data will fill the entire data set. A measured data set (10 additional data
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points) are collected and measured against the history. The mean and standard deviation of
the history and measured data set are calculated. If the measured data sets mean is outside
the range of the histories standard deviation from its mean, a migration is occurring and the
system is alerted. The next two measured data sets are ignored. If the data set following
the ignored data sets has a mean within the standard deviation of the initial data set, all the
captured data sets are moved into the history. Otherwise, if the initial data set was within the
range calculated by the histories, it is incorporated into the history. The next gathered data
set will be the initial data set in the algorithm and the process repeats itself.
5.2.5 Results
Initially ignoring data sets overcomes the issue of poisoning the history. However, this data
is incorporated after it has been maintained for several data sets, once it has determined that
a migration did not occur but the activity is changing from other external forces. The solution
appears to be effective and migrations are capable of being detected.
Cloud Provider Action: To ensure inconsistent results, it is best to slow the CPU’s execution
speed during the non-migration phase. This will reduce or eliminate the difference in the mean
between migration and non-migration intervals to an undetectable level.
Cloud Customer Resolution: In the virtual environment the customer has a lot of control.
When solutions are being created, it is necessary to build them to reliably and consistently
complete on the same time. If this is possible on a users personal machine, there should be
consistency in the cloud.
5.3 Network Profiling
As discovered in Section 4.2, the network can be very revealing. In addition to monitoring
the view of the network, measuring a networks operation is also possible. Cloud provider’s
claim little or no down-time but as discussed in Section 2.2.3, the live migration methods may
reveal that a migration is occurring.
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5.3.1 Data Collection
A simple program reads input from stdin, records the system time the input was received
before writing the time and input data to a file. For this experiment, the ping program is used
as a means of determining variability in the network. The cloud provider is still the threat. To
reduce the influence of the provider, computing resources outside the cloud environment are
accessed with ping. Ping is useful as it records the time it takes to hear a response from the
destination device. Ping uses Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo request packets
and measures the time from transmission to when a response is received. Sources were unaware
of their assistance in the detection scheme. This method reduces the memory imprint to a level
that does not affect the results.
At no time during the data collection process did ping encounter unresponsiveness (Des-
tination Host Unreachable) on behalf of the destination device. If it were to have happened,
a single result could be ignored, as each echo request/reply is independent. However, a large
number of unreturned requests could indicate a migration.
5.3.2 Baseline Characteristics
Baseline data, as viewed by the guest, was collected for a period of 15 minutes. The website
www.google.com (74.125.225.19) was used as the destination for the metric. The traceroute
program revealed there are 10 hops between the guest and the source. The first hop was
recognized as the dom0. Characteristics of a normal distribution can be seen in the output.
Data was recorded on intervals of a second. This is a side effect of the ping reports its findings.
Measure Baseline (ms) Non-migration Migration
Interval (ms) Interval (ms)
Minimum 26.30 26.70 26.90
Maximum 29.60 72.70 331.00
Mean 26.46 28.04 276.19
Median 26.40 27.00 286.00
Mode 26.40 27.00 286.00
Standard Deviation 0.15 2.83 11.73
Table 5.3 Ping Response Characteristics
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5.3.3 Migration Characteristics
There were several interesting characteristics introduced when migration occurred. Fig-
ure 5.3 baseline data plotted with migration data. Timing is not reflected in the Figure. First,
the migration process increased the transmission duration by at least a factor of 10. Secondly,
there was a duration of 20 to 40 seconds (depending on the migration) where no ping activity
occurred. This was located at the end of the live migration (indicated by the large time inter-
vals) and the return to normal baseline levels. This is unusual for the ping utility as outside
of that time period it recorded on a second interval. This is revealing as it indicates the halt
phase of the live migration process. Finally, the ping process stabilized quickly after migration
was complete. Migration characteristics are shown in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2. Figure 5.3
shows a ping response time of a complete live migration compared to baseline measurements
over a similar period of time. Performing a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reveals that
the null hypothesis (both samples are drawn from the same distribution) cannot be rejected.
The asymptotic p-value for the data set was 0.2928.
Figure 5.2 Normalized Ping Response Times
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Figure 5.3 Ping Interval Response
5.3.4 Detection Algorithm
The components used for this algorithm are mean, variance, and down-time. Down-time is
time when an action should have been occurring, however it was unable to occur, mimicking
what happens to ping at the end of migration). A history of the 20 most resent data actions is
kept at all times. These are used to calculate the mean and variance, the down-time is ignored
when calculating these values. The down-time is an obvious factor that migration is occurring.
A down-time of more than 7 seconds is flagged as a migration. The algorithm is described as
follows: Set migrationCount to zero and migrating watch boolean to false. A history would
be kept by initializing an array of size 10 with baseline measured data. Until the program
is executed the following would happen. If a migration had not been detected (migrating is
false), every 2 pings would be averaged before being put into the history. The three most recent
history elements are compared and if the difference is larger than twice the standard deviation,
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migrating is set to true. If migration is occurring, every 7 pings would be averaged before being
put into the history. The three most recent history elements are compared and if the difference
is larger than twice the standard deviation and the most recent value is smaller, migrating is
set to false. See Figure 5.4 for algorithm pseudo code.
Figure 5.4 Algorithm Pseudo code
36
5.3.5 Results
Data was collected from a variety of labs around the Iowa State University campus and
multiple sites were used as destinations. The effectiveness of the detection algorithm was worse
when the sample set had a small standard deviation. Added variability in the network, even a
random second or two would cause a migration alert to be triggered. Most sample sets that had
a standard deviation of between 1 and 3 seconds did not experiences any difficulty. Another
issue with the algorithm is switching destination devices. This could cause the transmission
duration to change outside the currently measured bounds inaccurately triggering a migration.
This could be fixed by reinitializing the history with baseline data associated with the new
entity before measurements are taken.
Cloud Provider Action: The provider could keep the network delay at or above the migration
delay. From the view of a customer it would create many false negatives.
Cloud Customer Resolution: With no control in how the network is operated, the best a
customer can do with network properties is monitor them. The provider will do what they can
to minimize cost. It would take additional resources and time to delay many devices on the
network (it is unlikely that a provider would only perform the act of hiding migration from one
customer).
5.3.6 Potential Implementation
It would be ineffective to constantly use the ping utility. It is necessary to build around
a mechanism that is required to be used. The guest needs to communicate with the distant
data storage device when reading or writing data to its disk. A monitoring program can wrap
around this process gathering the statistical data, reporting observed violations to the guest
and/or an alternate source.
5.3.7 Alternate Scenario: Client Response
Although this component was not studied due to time constraints and technical difficulty, it
brings up a complementary view of the recent the network profiling discovery measured through
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the perspective of the guest. There are times a customer may be interacting with their cloud
services and a potential migration may occur during that interaction. Based on the previous
results it would follow that the client would encounter some anomalies. It would be interesting
to see the clients perspective of a migration 0 correlates to the guest.
5.4 Summary
The algorithms described in this section are ad hoc. More rigorous approaches are needed.
These approached would not ignore history data. The environment these algorithms were
constructed and tested under was idea. There was minimal noise introduced on the test systems.
If noise was introduced it could affect the algorithms detection capability leading to different
false positive and false negative rates. These algorithms also took into account that migration
durations would last between 45 to 65 seconds. This time duration was true for this environment
but may not be true for a different environment.
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CHAPTER 6. Conclusion
As discussed in Chapter 1, the cloud is Pandora’s box and there is a need for research of the
security of available technologies. Based on the investigated characteristics, detection is rather
difficult with many characteristics experiencing false positives or false negatives. The affect of
which was studied in the characteristics of CPU throughput and network latency. The network
characteristics were the most successful in identifying the live migration process. This thesis
looked at security elements of virtualization and how changes may indicate a live migration has
occurred. This research provided the following contributions: building a test bed to simulate a
cloud computing environment, addressing the need for novel security techniques in the cloud by
investigating virtual machine and network properties for abnormal behavior, creating ad hoc
algorithms to detect live migration. In the future, additional elements worth investigating in-
clude migrating between different time zones, under variable bandwidth conditions, over longer
distances, how other programs are affected by the migration process, and the live migration
process of other virtualizations solutions compares the Xen. As well as actual implementation
and testing of these characteristics on a third-party cloud computing providers environment.
As the Xen Worlds project continues to evolve, so will the need for understanding vir-
tualization, cloud computing, and the security implications of connecting new technologies.
Future research would look into the live migration capabilities of VMware, KVM, and other
virtualization solutions to add to the number of system profiles. As the ISU Department of
Electrical and Computer Engineering expands its course into these new realms, new labs and
environments will have to be created to support course objectives.
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